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Adeline Chong 
 




The quotation will be familiar to any student of the conflict of laws: public policy is “a 
very unruly horse, when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”1 
Lately, it seems as if the unruly horse is heading towards an overt reference to a higher 
level order set of international norms in civil and commercial matters. This is manifested 
most clearly in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company (Nos 4 and 5),2 
but other instances can also be found. The focus of this article is on this emerging 
category of public policy, which is referred to here as transnational public policy. 
 
The main body of this article is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with 
making the case for the emergence of transnational public policy and articulating its 
characteristics, especially how it differs from, and fits within, the traditional categories of 
public policy. It will be argued that transnational public policy, despite having as its 
reference point principles and rules which cross borders, does not apply on a 
supranational level, and is best viewed as a species of international public policy. The 
second part of the article will delve into what sorts of principles and rules qualify as 
transnational public policy. It will be shown that certain rules of public international law 
                                                 
1 Burrough J. in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252. 
2 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883. 
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and universal principles of justice and morality can be considered as examples of 
transnational public policy. The last substantive part of the article is concerned with the 
interaction between transnational public policy and other established rules and policies. 
Given that, as argued, one is dealing with transnational and not supranational public 
policy, an issue arises on whether transnational public policy should prevail or yield 
when faced with conflicting rules. The last section therefore looks at the interaction 
between transnational public policy with forum statutory public policy, the public policy 
of finality in litigation, the policy against the non-enforcement of foreign penal, revenue 
or other public laws, the doctrine of state immunity and E.U. law.  
 
II. WHAT IS TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY? 
 
(a) The types of public policy 
 
Public policy has been described as an “escape route”3 for the court; it enables the court 
to refuse to apply a rule of the otherwise applicable foreign lex causae. It is generally 
accepted that there are two types of public policy. The first is what will be referred to as 
“domestic public policy”. This consists of public policy that is applicable only in a 
wholly domestic case. The second type of public policy comprises of public policy that is 
not dependent on English law being the lex causae. This is because the interests it seeks 
to protect are of a stronger nature than the interests protected under the first type of public 
policy. It is still domestic public policy, but one which is applicable in an international 
situation regardless of the lex causae. It will be referred to as “international public policy” 
                                                 
3 P.B. Carter, “The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law” (1993) 42 I.C.L.Q. 1 at 1. 
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to differentiate it from the first type of public policy. The difference between domestic 
public policy and international public policy may be illustrated by comparing the effect 
of different forms of duress on a contract. Lesser forms of duress, such as economic 
duress,4 are to be assessed in accordance with the governing law of the contract. However, 
English international public policy will not countenance more egregious forms of duress, 
such as a threat to use employees as human shields,5 whatever their effect under the 
governing law of the contract.   
 
The increasing harmonisation efforts of the European Union in the field of private law 
and private international law has arguably also led to the development of a third type of 
public policy in civil and commercial matters, i.e. E.U. public policy. A few points may 
be noted. First, the public policy provisions in the Rome I6 and Rome II7 Regulations and 
the Brussels I Regulation8 refer to national public policy, but national public policy is to 
be interpreted as including E.U. public policy.9 Secondly, while the European Court of 
Justice (E.C.J.) has consistently maintained that the conception of public policy is a 
matter for the national courts, it has, at the same time, reserved for itself the right to set 
the parameters within which the courts may invoke public policy.10 Thirdly, a provision 
                                                 
4 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Evia Luck) [1992] 2 A.C. 
152.  
5 Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] Q.B. 674. 
6 Art. 21. 
7 Art. 26. 
8 Art. 34(1). 
9 See, eg., Giuliano-Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention [1980] O.J. L 266/38; Case C-126/97 Eco 
Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] E.C.R. I-3055; Case C-7/98 Krombach v 
Bamberski [2000] E.C.R. I-1935. 
10 Case C-420/07 Apostolides v Orams [2009] E.C.R. I-3571 at [56]; Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski 
[2000] E.C.R. I-1935 at [22]-[23]; Case C-38/98 Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA 
[2000] E.C.R. I-2973 at [27]. 
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providing for application of “Community public policy” in the draft Rome II Regulation11 
did not make it into the final text but this does not indicate that such a category does not 
exist; the rejected provision was on the specific point of non-compensatory damages 
ostensibly being against “Community public policy”. Fourthly, the Supreme Court has 
also alluded to “European public policy”.12 There is therefore credence to the view that a 
category of E.U. public policy has developed. The E.U. public policy which can be 
identified from the jurisprudence of the E.C.J. includes the “public economic policy”13 of 
the E.U. and public policy that is derived from the principles set out in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (E.C.H.R.).14 
 
Some commentators argue that there is a fourth type of public policy, which is variously 
referred to as truly international public policy, transnational public policy, supranational 
public policy or world public policy.15 The development and support for this concept has 
mainly arisen in the field of international arbitration and not in civil litigation in the 
courts. 16  This type of public policy has as its reference point international law and 
                                                 
11 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), COM (2003) 427 final, draft Art. 24. 
12 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39; [2011] 3 W.L.R. 487 at [91]. 
13 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] E.C.R. I-3055 at [38] 
(Opinion of Advocate General Saggio). Cf. Case C-38/98 Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v 
Maxicar SpA [2000] E.C.R. I-2973.  
14 Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] E.C.R. I-1935. The E.C.H.R. is incorporated into U.K. law 
by the Human Rights Act 1988. See further below, section IV(e). 
15 J. Dolinger, “World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1982) 17 
Texas Int. L. J. 167 (and the sources cited therein); D.C. Burger, “Transnational Public Policy as a Factor in 
Choice of Law Analysis” (1983-1984) 5 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int. & Comp. L. 367. 
16 P. Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration” in P. 
Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (I.C.C.A. Congress Series 
No. 3) (Boston: Kluwer, 1987) p. 257; P. Lagarde, “Chapter 11: Public Policy” in International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. III, Private International Law (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994) p. 
51; F. Mantilla-Serrano, “Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy” (2004) 20 Arb. Int. 333; J. 
Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1978) p. 535. 
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universal principles of morality. One of the earliest proponents is the French 
commentator Niboyet17 who identified “a real international public order, common to the 
civilized nations, that all have the duty to respect in order not to step out of the legal 
community which is the basis of private international law.”18 Its most ardent proponents 
consider this type of public policy to be hierarchically superior to the other types of 
public policies as it is considered to serve the higher interests of the world community at 
large.19  
 
While the application of a public policy which harks back to natural law theory and 
Kelsenian ideals may be appealing on an instinctive level, the concept does not translate 
well to private civil litigation before English courts. First, the English legal system 
largely supports the dualist model that international law and national law do not operate 
on the same plane;20 for example, generally, an international treaty has to be enacted as 
an Act of Parliament before it has the force of law in the United Kingdom.21 Secondly, 
the English legal system adopts the constitutional separation of powers between the three 
arms of government. There is therefore a tension if a principle originating from a 
supranational category of public policy conflicts with forum public policy.22 If the forum 
                                                 
17 J.P. Niboyet, “Order Public” (1931) 10 Repertoire de Droit International, Chap. V. 
18 Quoted in Dolinger, “World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” 
(1982) 17 Texas Int. L. J. 167 at 170; citing in turn F. Rigaux, (1977) Droit Public et Droit Prive dans les 
Relations Internationales 199. 
19 E.g., Dolinger, “World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1982) 17 
Texas Int. L. J. 167. 
20 Cf. the monism theory, i.e. that international law and national law comprise a single body of law, and that 
international law is superior to national law.  
21 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 A.C. 418; R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Ex p Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696; R v Lyons [2003] 1 A.C. 976. Cf. Republic 
of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration and Production Co [2005] EWCA Civ 1116; [2006] Q.B. 432. 
22 Rules relating to environmental protection may be one example; international standards may be higher 
than national standards which will be set with a view to allowing adequate economic development and 
industrialisation. 
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public policy is manifested as a statutory rule, the position is clear: the English court 
cannot apply a supranational public policy which conflicts with the English statutory 
public policy as its obligation is to apply the law as enacted by Parliament. If the forum 
public policy is found at common law, then there is scope for arguing that the courts 
could decide to apply the conflicting supranational public policy over forum public policy 
as the common law is the domain of the courts and subject to incremental development 
by the courts. However, the Court of Appeal in Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways 
Corp (Nos 4 and 5) held that if English public policy differs from clearly established 
principles of international law, the court would no doubt be required to follow the 
dictates or limits of that English public policy.23 
 
The ground is therefore not promising for the recognition of a category of supranational 
public policy as has been advanced in the field of arbitration. Nevertheless, English 
courts have often referred to either public international law or “universal” principles of 
justice and morality when applying public policy. It is suggested that there does exist a 
type of public policy which has as its reference point, not forum-centric norms, but more 
“universal” rules and principles. This type of public policy will be referred to here as 
transnational public policy. However, it is clear for the reasons articulated above that this 
category of transnational public policy cannot be a supranational concept which prevails 
over forum public policy; rather, it would be more accurate to represent it as a species of 
international public policy. How this category of transnational public policy differs from 
the general body of international public policy will be examined next. 
 
                                                 
23 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [323].  
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(b) Transnational public policy as a species of international public policy 
 
Generally, international public policy involves the application of forum-centric principles. 
This can be shown by examining a trio of cases commonly discussed under the rubric of 
international public policy. In Kaufman v Gerson,24 a French woman had entered into a 
contract to repay money that had been misappropriated by her husband under threat of the 
criminal prosecution of her husband. The contract was valid by its proper law, French law. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal refused to enforce the contract as contravening “an 
essential moral interest” according to English law.25 It has been doubted whether a court 
would nowadays consider the degree of coercion exercised in Kaufman sufficient to 
interfere in what was essentially a French contract with little or no connection with 
England.26 Nevertheless, the point remains: an English court usually refers to English 
notions of morality and justice when applying English (international) public policy. The 
other two cases also involve a reference back to English principles and concerns, namely 
the concern to maintain the good image of the United Kingdom and its relationships with 
other sovereign states. Foster v Driscoll27 involved a plan to smuggle alcohol into the 
United States during the Prohibition. Regazzoni v KC Sethia28 concerned a contract for 
the sale and delivery of jute from India to Genoa in circumstances where the jute would 
ultimately be exported to South Africa in contravention of Indian law. The English court 
refused to enforce both contracts. The cases are generally accepted to stand for the 
proposition that an English court will not enforce a contract which entails performance 
                                                 
24 [1904] 1 K.B. 591. 
25 [1904] 1 K.B. 591 at 600. 
26 Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] Q.B. 674 at 689D. See further, text to fn. 36 below.  
27 [1929] 1 K.B. 470. 
28 [1958] A.C. 301. 
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which is illegal by the law of a friendly and foreign state. The contracts in both cases 
were governed by English law but it is accepted that the policy holds even if some other 
law was the governing law of the contract.29 The head of public policy invoked involved 
considerations of comity: “[j]ust as public policy avoids contracts which offend against 
our own law, so it will avoid at least some contracts which violate the laws of a foreign 
State, and it will do so because public policy demands that deference to international 
comity.”30  
 
It is clear that the considerations underlying the above trio of cases were mainly Anglo-
centric: to preserve English notions of morality, and to preserve good relations between 
the United Kingdom and friendly foreign states. Transnational public policy however 
involves a move away from forum-centric notions of public policy. This is not to say that 
a principle of transnational public policy may not also coincide with a principle which 
according to English law itself ought to be protected.31 That does not detract from the 
point that one of the characteristics of transnational public policy is that it refers to a set 
of rules and principles which crosses borders, although some of those principles may 
themselves already form part of English public policy. It is suggested that another 
characteristic distinguishes transnational public policy from the general body of 
international public policy: there is no need for a connection to be established with 
England before it is invoked. One of the fundamental principles underlying the conflict of 
laws is that a forum court is prepared to apply a foreign law to a case with international 
                                                 
29 Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] Q.B. 674 at 692E.  
30 Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] A.C. 301 at 319. 
31 E.g., contracts of slavery would be against English public policy (R v Knowles, ex parte Somersett (1772) 
20 State Tr. 1); but such contracts would also be against the jus cogens norm of prohibition of slavery. 
  9 
elements before it. Therefore many countries require there to be a connection with the 
forum before the forum courts would impose its public policy on a case: “public policy 
only comes into play if the vital interests of the State of the forum are concerned.”32 This 
is often referred to as the theory of relativity of public policy or Inlandsbeziehung. 33 
However, it is notable that cases which involve transnational principles do not require a 
substantial connection with England before transnational public policy is applied.34 This 
is because the English court is not applying Angle-centric laws and norms but rather laws 
and norms that are accepted across borders. A couple of clarifications are in order. First, 
there may be a connection with England depending on the facts of the case, but if the 
reference is to transnational rules and principles, it should be recognised that 
transnational public policy is invoked.35 The point made is not that there will never be a 
connection with England in instances of transnational public policy, but that it is not 
necessary for there to be a connection. Secondly, cases where the English court has 
imposed its own values which are not shared on a wider basis to a case with little 
connection with England should not be seen as instances of transnational public policy in 
action. They are rather misguided attempts to apply domestic or international public 
policy in a situation which does not warrant it.36 
                                                 
32 F.A. Mann, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 377. 
33 E.g., F.A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) pp. 163-164; O. 
Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings (London: Stevens & Sons, 1978) pp. 247-248; Lagarde, “Chapter 11: 
Public Policy” in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. III, Private International Law, 
1994, p. 22; D. Lloyd, Public Policy: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (London, 
University of London: The Athlone Press, 1953) p. 84. 
34 E.g., Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 
A.C. 883.  
35 E.g., Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249. 
36 E.g., Collins M.R. in Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 K.B. 591 at 598 held that: “It appears to me that the 
principle upon which English Courts act in refusing to enforce such a contract is one which, if it is not, 
ought to be universally recognised ….” The position taken here in relation to Kaufman is that the policy 
applied should have been recognised to be one of domestic English public policy and not international, let 
alone, transnational public policy.  
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The two characteristics of transnational public policy identified above will be fleshed out 
in more detail in the next section where instances of invocation of transnational public 
policy will be examined in order to construe its content. 
 
III. WHEN DO WE RECOGNISE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY? 
 
Transnational public policy in civil and commercial matters has mainly been invoked in 
two situations: where breach of international law occurs or some principle of 
international law has to be preserved; and where the transaction is alleged to transgress 
universally accepted principles of morality and justice. 
 
(a) Breach of public international law 
 
Professor Mann noted in 1975 that “one cannot help noticing symptoms of ordre public 
acquiring a more international rather than a national or even nationalistic character”.37 
However, he maintained that references to public policy and comity by the courts are, in 
certain cases, a byword for public international law38 and that it would be preferable for 
public international law to be enforced by means of direct application rather than 
obliquely through the back door.39 Public international law however primarily deals with 
the law governing relations between sovereign states and its principles bind states, not 
                                                 
37  Further Studies in International Law, 1990, p. 159 (reproduction of “The Consequences of an 
International Wrong in International and National Law” in (1975-1976) 49 B.Y.I.L. 1). 
38 E.g., F.A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) Chapters 7 and 8. 
39 Mann, Studies in International Law, 1973, p. 379. 
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national courts. For example, treaties signed by the U.K. government do not bind the 
courts unless and until incorporated as part of U.K. law by legislation; 40 the same has 
been thought to apply to other international instruments such as U.N. Resolutions.41 
Direct application of public international law by the courts may also impinge on foreign 
relations between states and encroach on the constitutional separation of powers between 
the courts and the executive. There are “forbidden areas”, such as foreign policy, where 
courts may not venture.42 In addition, as discussed above, English law must prevail in any 
clash between public international law and English law. Further, while it used to be 
thought that customary international law would automatically be incorporated into 
national law,43 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones has stated: “I would for my part 
hesitate, at any rate without much fuller argument, to accept this proposition in quite the 
unqualified terms in which it has often been stated.”44 This is not to say that English 
courts never directly apply public international law, however, in the private international 
law context it may be more practical for courts mainly to give indirect effect to public 
international law through the aegis of transnational public policy.   
 
In Oppenheimer v Cattermole, Lord Cross of Chelsea opined that it is part of English 
public policy to give effect to clearly established rules of international law. 45  The 
                                                 
40 See fn. 21 above. 
41 R (on the application of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC (Admin) 
2777 at [61]. 
42 R (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1598 at [106(iii)]. 
43 Triquet v Bath (1764) 3 Burr. 1478 at 1481; Emperor of Austria v Day and Kossuth (1861) 2 Giff. 628 at 
678; JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1989] Ch. 72 at 207. 
44 [2006] UKHL 16; [2007] 1 A.C. 136 at [11]. The more accurate position is that customary international 
law forms part of national law only to the extent to which the constitution permits: R v Jones [2006] UKHL 
16; [2007] 1 A.C. 136 at [23].  
45 [1976] A.C. 249 at 278. See also Re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd [1956] Ch. 323. 
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emphasis must be understood to be on the phrase “clearly established”. In The Rose 
Mary,46 the Supreme Court of Aden conducted an extensive review of foreign decisions 
and writings of international law scholars before concluding that Persian legislation 
which confiscated oil in Persia belonging to an English company was a breach of 
international law and invalid. In addition, not every breach of international law will 
trigger public policy.47  
 
The use of public international law as transnational public policy in private civil litigation 
can usefully be illustrated by comparing and contrasting two cases: Kuwait Airways 
Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company (Nos 4 and 5)48 and Apostolides v Orams.49 
 
The seminal case on the use of public international law as a source of transnational public 
policy is Kuwait Airways. In Kuwait Airways, aircraft belonging to Kuwait Airways 
Corporation (K.A.C.) had been seized by the Iraqi authorities during the invasion of 
Kuwait and moved to Iraq. Resolution 369 was then passed by the Revolutionary 
Command Council of Iraq to divest K.A.C. of its ownership of the aircraft and vest 
ownership in Iraqi Airways Company (I.A.C.). K.A.C. sued I.A.C. in England for 
damages in the tort of conversion. The claim was subject to the common law double 
actionability rule in tort,50 as laid down in Boys v Chaplin51 and further refined in cases 
                                                 
46 [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246. 
47 Kuwait Airways v Iraqi Airways Company (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [114]. 
48 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883; hereafter Kuwait Airways. 
49 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519. 
50 The relevant events had occurred prior to the enactment of Part III of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
51 [1971] A.C. 356. 
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such as Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA.52 That being the case, it had to be 
shown that I.A.C.’s actions were (i) actionable as a tort according to English law if the 
acts had been committed in England; and (ii) civilly actionable according to the lex loci 
delicti, i.e. Iraqi law. This two-limb test is subject to a flexible exception that a particular 
issue may be governed by the law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. In addition, the usual 
public policy caveat applies. 
 
The tortious claim however involved an underlying property issue. If RCC Resolution 
369 was recognised by the court, the effect would be that I.A.C. were the legitimate 
owners of the aircraft and could not be liable for converting them. The choice of law rule 
for title to property is the lex situs;53 this pointed on the facts to Iraqi law and a decision 
in favour of I.A.C. However, a majority of the House of Lords refused to recognise 
Resolution 369 on grounds of public policy. Once Resolution 369 was excised in this 
manner from the corpus of Iraqi law, I.A.C. were liable for usurpation under Iraqi law 
(minus Resolution 369) and the double actionability rule was thus satisfied.54 Although 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead55 and Lord Hope of Craighead56 mentioned the flexibility 
with which the double actionability rule is intended to be applied, the excision of 
Resolution 369 cannot be maintained on the basis of the flexible exception to the double 
actionability rule. The exception has, so far, operated to disapply either limb of the 
                                                 
52 [1995] 1 A.C. 190. 
53 Cammell v Sewell (1860) 5 H. & N. 728. 
54 Their Lordships differed slightly on how the rule was fulfilled; for a useful summary, see A. Briggs, 
“Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: a Sword and a Shield?” (2002) 6 Sing. J. Int. & Comp. L. 953 at 970.  
55 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [33]. Lord Hoffmann agreed with Lord Nicholls’s judgment. 
56 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [151]-[160]. 
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double actionability rule where a particular issue between the parties has the most 
significant relationship with the law identified by the other limb.57 On the facts of Kuwait 
Airways, Iraqi law had more to do with the case than English law; the operation of the 
exception should have led to the exclusion of English, not Iraqi law. The excision of 
Resolution 369 cannot therefore be justified as part of the operation of the exception. 
Instead, public policy, independently of the exception to the double actionability rule, 
formed the crux of the decision. 
 
There are two points that are specifically relevant to this article. First, the public policy 
that was applied by the courts was said to be one which was “truly international”58 in 
nature. Lord Nicholls regarded it as being “plain beyond argument” that the seizure and 
assimilation of the aircraft “were flagrant violations of rules of international law of 
fundamental importance.”59 The actions of the Iraqi authorities breached both customary 
international law and the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Security Council had, among other 
actions, swiftly condemned the invasion of Kuwait, demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait60 and requested all member states to protect the assets of the Kuwaiti 
government and not to recognise the annexation by Iraq.61 Their Lordships emphasised 
that the United Kingdom, as a member of the United Nations, had the obligation to accept 
and carry out decisions of the U.N. Security Council,62 and recognising or giving effect to 
RCC Resolution 369 in any way would undermine that obligation. The public 
                                                 
57 Cf. Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 S.L.R. 377at [56]-[57]. 
58 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [115] (Lord Steyn); at [168] (Lord Hope). 
59 Similarly strong language was used by the other Lordships; see, e.g., [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 
883 at [107] (Lord Steyn); at [148]-[149] (Lord Hope). 
60 Resolution 660. 
61 Resolution 661 and 662. 
62 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [29] (Lord Nicholls); at [114] (Lord Steyn); at [141] (Lord Hope). 
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international law underpinnings of the use of public policy in Kuwait Airways was 
therefore very clearly laid out. 
 
The second point of importance is that the upshot of the majority’s decision is that a tort, 
which had no connection with England save that England was the forum for the action, 
was effectively governed by English law. This point formed the basis of Lord Scott of 
Foscote’s dissent.63 The lack of a substantial connection with England was also conceded 
by their Lordships in the majority.64 However, as Lord Hope noted, while the lack of a 
substantial connection may be grounds for refusing to apply a principle of English public 
policy which was purely domestic or parochial in nature, the principle of public policy 
involved here was one which was truly international in nature.65 Connection with the 
forum is therefore not a necessary pre-requisite when transnational public policy is 
invoked. 
 
Given the influence of public international law and U.N. Security Council Resolutions on 
public policy in Kuwait Airways, it is not surprising that a similar argument was 
attempted in Apostolides v Orams.66 The background to the case concerned the internal 
division of Cyprus into the northern area controlled by the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (T.R.N.C.) and the southern Greek-Cypriot area. The T.R.N.C. has not been 
                                                 
63 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [174] and [198]. 
64 See [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [10] (Lord Nicholls); at [166] (Lord Hope). 
65 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [166]-[168]. 
66 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519. See also the failed attempt to rely on the U.K.’s international law 
obligations under another U.N. Security Council Resolution in Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2010] EWCA Civ 758; [2011] Q.B. 773. 
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recognised by any state apart from Turkey while the Republic of Cyprus is internationally 
recognised as being sovereign over the whole island.  
 
The material facts are: Mr and Mrs Orams, a British couple, bought a house in the 
northern part of Cyprus. They were thereafter faced with a claim for ownership of the 
land and damages connected with loss of enjoyment of the land by Mr Apostolides, the 
owner of the land who, amongst many others, had been forced to flee the northern part of 
Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of the northern area in 1974. Judgment was granted 
in favour of Mr Apostolides by a Greek Cypriot court in the south. He tried to get the 
judgment enforced in England under the Brussels I Regulation. The Orams raised the 
point that the Cypriot judgment should not be recognised on the basis of Article 34(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation67 as being against “international public policy”. This point was 
based on an argument raised by the Commission in a first reference made to the E.C.J.68 
The Commission had argued that recognition of the Greek-Cypriot judgment relating to 
land lying in the areas where the recognised government of Cyprus does not exercise 
control may raise a “very exceptional” ground of “international public policy”. By this, 
the Commission, and by extension the Orams, meant what is referred to in this article as 
transnational public policy. The gist of the Commission’s submissions were that while 
Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation refers to the “public policy in the Member 
State”, national public policy includes public policy grounds which are of an international 
                                                 
67 Art. 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation allows the enforcing Member State court to refuse to enforce a 
foreign judgment on grounds that it is manifestly against its public policy. 
68 The point had actually been taken up by the Orams but was not submitted by the Court of Appeal in its 
reference. None of the answers to the first reference by the E.C.J. were conducive to the Orams’s case: 
Case C-420/07 Apostolides v Orams [2009] E.C.R. I-3571. See T. Hartley, “Cyprus Land Rights: Conflict 
of Laws Meets International Politics” (2009) 58 I.C.L.Q. 1013. 
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character and shared by all E.U. member states; a mechanism had already been created at 
the request of the European Court of Human Rights for restitution and compensation with 
respect to property situated in northern Cyprus; 69  and recognising and enforcing 
judgments in relation to such property might exacerbate the peace and reconciliation 
efforts.  
 
The Orams referred to international instruments to support their case. When Cyprus 
acceded to the European Union in May 2004, Protocol No. 1070 attached to the Act of 
Accession provided for the special circumstance of Cyprus.71 In particular, the Protocol 
reaffirmed the Member States “commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
problem, consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and their strong 
support for the efforts of the U.N. Secretary General to that end.” U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions had also called upon all relevant parties to support a comprehensive 
negotiation on a final political solution to the Cyprus problem.72 For example, Resolution 
1251 (25 June 1999) called upon all states “to respect the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and requesting them, along with the parties 
concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity, as well as from any attempt at partition of the 
island or its unification with any other country”. The Orams thus submitted that given the 
political sensitivities involved, enforcement of the Cypriot judgment would prejudice the 
                                                 
69 The Immovable Property Commission had been set up by the T.R.N.C. 
70 [2003] O.J. L 236/955. 
71 The operation of the acquis communautaire was suspended in the northern area of Cyprus: Art. 1(1).  
72 All U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus are listed at: http://www.un.int/cyprus/resolut.htm 
(accessed on 14 September 2011). 
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peace negotiations and it would thereby be contrary to English public policy to enforce 
the Cypriot judgment.  
 
On the face of it, the dispute was one between two private parties but the decision 
obviously had bigger ramifications. Mr Apostolides was among many dispossessed 
owners of land in north Cyprus; similarly, Mr and Mrs Orams were among many who 
claimed to have bought expropriated land in good faith. It was, as Jack J. recognised, “an 
international problem ill-suited to be resolved by private litigation.”73 In fact, similar 
cases had been heard by the European Court of Human Rights (E.Ct.H.R.), with Turkey 
being the defendant where the E.Ct.H.R. held that the dispossessed owners remained the 
true owners of the land in north Cyprus.74 This was therefore hardly a promising context 
for the Orams’s argument. 
 
The Court of Appeal considered the views of Advocate General Kokott; the 
Commission’s submissions on “international public policy” were not addressed by the 
E.C.J. but had been discussed in Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion. In her view, the 
international consensus and U.N. Security Council Resolutions on the importance on 
reaching a settlement on the Cyprus problem were much too general in nature to infer any 
obligation not to recognise the judgment. 75  In addition, it was not clear whether 
recognition would cause the resolution of the Cyprus problem to advance or regress.76 
Advocate General Kokott thought that complex political assessments such as were 
                                                 
73 [2007] 1 W.L.R. 241 at [30]. 
74 Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 513. 
75 Case C-420/07 [2009] E.C.R. I-3571 at [111]. 
76 Case C-420/07 [2009] E.C.R. I-3571 at [111]. 
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involved in the Cyprus problem would be contrary to the objective of legal certainty 
which underpins the Brussels I Regulation.77 The Court of Appeal agreed with Advocate 
General Kokott and adopted her reasoning. 78  The court held that the Orams had to 
identify a principle of “international public policy” that would lead the court to refuse 
enforcement of the Cypriot judgment. While there was an international consensus on the 
need to resolve the Cyprus problem, it was a “very large step” from acknowledgement of 
the international consensus to accepting that it would be against public policy for the U.K. 
to refuse to enforce Cypriot judgments. 79  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal was 
concerned to balance the need to encourage the peace process in Cyprus with the U.K.’s 
obligation to respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, which included respect 
for its courts.80 The Court of Appeal may also have been troubled on whether a contrary 
decision would have amounted to an indirect recognition of the T.R.N.C., contrary to the 
U.K. government’s stance.81 It was clearly uncomfortable with wading into the political 
and international law dimensions of the case: 
 
“the court would need to assess the issues arising in the Cypriot dispute, the 
merits of the political issues, both national and international, involved and their 
                                                 
77 Case C-420/07 [2009] E.C.R. I-3571 at [48].  
78 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519 at [60] and [64]. 
79 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519 at [59]. 
80 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519 at [61]-[62]. 
81 P. Athanassiou, “The Orams Case, the Judgments Regulation and Public Policy: An English and 
European Law Perspective” (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal 423 at 446. See also R (on the application of 
Kibris Türk Hava Yollari v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 1093; [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
274.  
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impact on public policy in the United Kingdom. Save in exceptional 
circumstances, that is not a function which courts can or should perform.”82  
 
Although Apostolides v Orams played out against a backdrop of events (i.e. the resolution 
of the Cyprus problem) on which there was an international consensus in much the same 
manner in which international condemnation of Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait provided the 
setting in Kuwait Airways, the crucial difference between the two cases is that the 
international consensus in Kuwait Airways led to a clear way in which that consensus 
could find voice in transnational public policy. In contrast, the international agreement on 
the importance on resolving Cyprus’s political situation did not indicate, one way or the 
other, whether the English court would best serve that purpose by recognising or refusing 
to recognise the Greek-Cypriot problem.83 International consensus on a certain course of 
events therefore does not automatically translate into a norm of transnational public 
policy; something more concrete and tangible that is specific to the question faced by the 
court is required. Further, as Apostolides demonstrates, U.N. Resolutions84 by themselves 
are often of little help as they tend to be vague in terms of what needs to be done to 
achieve their aim.  
 
Other recent attempts to capitalise on the principle of Kuwait Airways have failed at an 
even earlier stage – when it comes to establishing that there is a specific rule of 
                                                 
82 [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519 at [59]. Cf. Regazzoni v KC Sethia, where the House of Lords did 
not consider that their decision indicated that they were taking sides in any way in the dispute between 
Indian and South Africa: [1958] A.C. 301 at 326 (Lord Reid) and at 327 (Lord Keith of Avonholm).  
83 Cf. Case C-292/05 Lechouritou v Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias [2007] E.C.R. 
I-1519. 
84 Kuwait Airways and Apostolides involved U.N. Security Council Resolutions but the same point of 
vagueness can be made in relation to Resolutions emanating from the General Assembly. 
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international law or policy in the first place. In Peer International Corpn v Termidor 
Music Publishers Ltd (No. 1),85 a Cuban law purported to have the effect of divesting 
U.K. companies of ownership of U.K. copyright over musical works composed by Cuban 
artists. The claim was classified as being proprietary in nature and the choice of law rule 
was the lex situs, i.e. English law, under which copyright had been validly assigned to the 
U.K. companies. The argument was made that the lex situs rule was subject to 
considerations of public policy and comity. Therefore, an English court can give effect to 
the Cuban law as it regularizes a matter of legitimate interest and accords with United 
Kingdom law and “public policy widely accepted internationally”. 86  The rationale 
underlying the last point was that the policy behind the Cuban law, i.e. to re-exert Cuban 
control over works created by Cuban nationals and prevent further exploitation of those 
works by foreign companies, was a policy which had credence on an international basis.87 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting that the argument was an attempt to 
use public policy in a novel way, i.e. to give positive force to Cuban law which was not 
the lex causae,88 and that it was not established that there is an internationally accepted 
view on public policy as to assignments of copyright.89 Similar short shrift was given in 
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones SA v Deutsche Bank AG90 to the submission 
that there had been a breach of international law when shares in a Bolivian company had 
                                                 
85 [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212. 
86 [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212 at [45]. 
87 See further below for a discussion of a transnational public policy of protection of national cultural 
heritage; section IV(c). 
88 [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212 at [47] (Aldous L.J.) and [63] (Mance L.J.). 
89 [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212 at [46]. 
90 [2009] EWHC 2579 (QB); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 649.  
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been compulsorily acquired by the Bolivian state without compensation,91 at least where 
there was no element of racial or religious discrimination.92 
 
Apostolides, Peer International and Empresa illustrate the difficulties of successfully 
appealing towards a higher level of public policy in a civil and commercial context.93 The 
arguments mounted in Peer International and Empresa stood little chance of success in 
the absence of concrete evidence that there was international consensus on the existence 
of rules of international law such as those alleged. The international consensus was 
present in Apostolides, but did not point towards a sufficiently clear path for the courts to 
be able to apply transnational public policy. What can be derived from the cases is this: if 
the appeal to transnational public policy is to be founded on some sort of breach of public 
international law, it is clear that first, the rule of public international law has to be 
unambiguous; and secondly, an indisputable breach of that rule has to be involved.94 It 
will however be rare for breaches of international law to be as egregious or admitted as in 
Kuwait Airways. Given that Lord Steyn in Kuwait Airways was careful to stress that not 
every breach of international law will trigger the public policy exception,95 the degree of 
flagrancy that has to be involved before transnational public policy can be prayed in aid 
remains regrettably unclear.  
 
(b) Breach of “universal” principles of morality and justice 
                                                 
91 The Bolivian decree provided for the payment of compensation but no compensation had been paid yet. 
92 See also Luther v Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532; Princess Paley of Olga v Weiscz [1929] 1 K.B. 718.  
93 In all three cases, it was observed that there was no parallel to the situation in Kuwait Airways: Peer 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212 at [46]; Empresa [2009] EWHC 2579 (QB); [2010] 1 All E.R. 
(Comm) 649 at [22]; Orams [2010] EWCA Civ 9; [2011] Q.B. 519 implicit at [59]. 
94 Kuwait Airways [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883. Cf. Habib v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] 
F.C.A.F.C. 12 (Federal Court of Australia) where the alleged breaches were not yet established. 
95 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [114]. 
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Transnational public policy is also supposed to reflect universal principles of morality 
and justice.96 Lord Halsbury L.C. declared that: “Where a contract is void on the ground 
of immorality, or is contrary to such positive law as would prohibit the making of such a 
contract at all, then the contract would be void all over the world, and no civilized 
country would be called on to enforce it.”97 However, the court which is relying on a 
purported transnational public policy to disapply a foreign rule cannot claim to be 
applying a universal principle. If a certain principle is accepted universally, then no rule 
of any legal system would fall foul of the principle. Therefore, the reference point is 
values that are shared by all nations, or, failing unanimity, all civilised nations, or, failing 
unanimity within that cohort, at least most of all civilised nations. In other words, the 
appeal to universal principles of morality and justice more accurately means an appeal to 
principles which should be accepted universally.98   
 
Principles, not being rules, may be suspect of being a form of soft law. However, such 
fundamental principles take more tangible form particularly in the area of human rights. 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights99 are some of the more 
important international instruments in this field. They are evidence of an international 
consensus on the importance of protecting human rights; some human rights principles 
                                                 
96 K.P. Berger, “The Modern Trend Towards Exclusion of Recourse Against Transnational Arbitral Awards: 
A European Perspective” (1988-1989) 12 Fordham Int. L. J. 605 at 642; Lagarde, “Chapter 11: Public 
Policy” in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. III, Private International Law, 1994, p. 
48. 
97 In re Missouri Steamship Company (1889) 42 Ch.D. 321 at 336. 
98 Any references to universal principles and the like below must be read subject to this caveat. 
99 Incorporated into U.K. law by the Human Rights Act 1988. 
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may also form jus cogens.100 The elevated status of human rights is illustrated by the 
suggestion of Lord Steyn in Re McKerr that human rights treaties enjoy a special status in 
that the court may give immediate effect to such treaties without requiring any prior 
enactment into domestic law.101 The notion of human rights and the degree of protection 
afforded may nevertheless vary across the world as much depends on each country’s 
political, social and economic background.102 It is easy however to think of examples of 
human rights principles which truly cross borders in international law: rules which 
prohibit piracy, the use of armed force in international relations,103 torture,104 genocide 
and slavery,105 as well as rules on drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and terrorism.106 
The repulsion of racism is another example; Lord Cross in Oppenheimer v Cattermole 
declared of a Nazi law which stripped German Jews of their nationality that: “To my 
mind a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the 
courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.”107 Even Regazzoni v 
                                                 
100 Rules of jus cogens are peremptory rules of international law and are superior to other rules of 
international law. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53.  
101 [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 807at [49]-[50]. This has been argued to be incorrect by P. Sales and 
J. Clement, “International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing Framework” (2008) 124 L.Q.R. 388 at 
398-400. 
102 M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Oxford: OUP, 6th edn, 2007) p. 342. 
103 See Nicaragua v United States of America 1986 I.C.J. 14; Kuwait Airways [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 
A.C. 883 at [114].  
104 Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270; 
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273. 
105 V. Lowe, International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007) p. 59; Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 2007, p. 
40. 
106 Kuwait Airways [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [115]; Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly 
International) Public Policy and International Arbitration” in Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration 
Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (I.C.C.A. Congress Series No. 3), 1987, pp. 284-285. 
107 [1976] A.C. 249 at 278. The statement was obiter. 
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KC Sethia108 has been attributed to have the underlying objective of countering racist 
South African legislation.109  
 
Even if one leaves aside such an emotive issue as human rights protection, other 
fundamental values can be discerned. It has been said that bribery and corruption, at least 
in their most extreme form, could not conceivably be accepted in any country.110 The 
repulsion with which bribery and corruption is viewed is exemplified by Lord 
Templeman’s statement that: “Bribery is an evil practice which threatens the foundations 
of any civilized society.”111 Yet it is easy to think of countries where bribery is a way of 
life whatever lip service may be paid by the relevant authorities as to its vileness. In some 
other countries, a less egregious form of corruption may take place in the form of 
payments of commissions. The line between illegal bribes and legal commissions may 
therefore be very fine in certain countries and will also shift according to a country’s 
cultural, economic and political background. So, sometimes, while a core principle of 
may be identified as being universally shared, there is no universal benchmark. It would 
be difficult to identify and apply a transnational public policy in this type of situation.112 
 
                                                 
108 [1958] A.C. 301. 
109 Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration” in Sanders 
(ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (I.C.C.A. Congress Series No. 3), 
1987, p. 280. 
110 F.M.B. Reynolds, “The Enforcement of Contracts Involving Corruption or Illegality in Other Countries” 
(1997) Sing. J. Legal Stud. 371 at 385. See also Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public 
Policy and International Arbitration” in Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy 
in Arbitration (I.C.C.A. Congress Series No. 3), 1987, pp. 276-277. 
111 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324 at 330. 
112 E.g., Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] Q.B. 448. 
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While universal principles of morality and justice may prove to be more of a moral 
abstract rather than a practical construct in some cases, it is suggested that such principles, 
where identifiable, deserve protection through the aegis of transnational public policy.  
 
(c) Conclusion  
 
It is conceded that the discussion in the preceding section demonstrates that the task of 
identifying transnational public policy is far from easy. Nevertheless, this is not an 
indication that this category does not exist. It is inevitable with any developing area of 
law that ambiguities will only be cleared up with the passage of time. At least, it has been 
shown that certain rules of public international law and universal principles of morality 
and justice can be considered to make up transnational public policy.  
 
Certain hurdles may lie when transnational public policy comes up against other 
conflicting policies.  This will be examined next. 
 
 
IV. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND OTHER POLICIES 
 
Transnational public policy, having as its reference point norms of public international 
law and universal principles of morality and justice, stands for a very strong and narrow 
type of public policy. However, as has been pointed out above, there is, as yet, no real 
basis for arguing that a supranational public policy exists in private international law. 
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This means that transnational public policy cannot be assumed to be superior to all other 
rules whenever invoked.  
 
If transnational public policy does not start out in the superior position, when does it 
prevail and when does it yield when faced up with conflicting rules or policies? The aim 
of this section is to consider this very issue. The potential use of transnational public 
policy to safeguard international values to a further extent than is presently the case will 
also be explored below. 
   
(a) Transnational public policy and forum statutory public policy 
 
Although transnational public policy consists of fundamental principles that have 
universal value, it is clear that these “strong” principles do not prevail against English 
statutory public policy. The constitutional separation of powers does not allow the courts 
to override Parliamentary will. Transnational public policy, despite its international law 
underpinnings, is a common law concept and it is trite law that statute takes precedence 
over the common law.113 The courts’ power to develop the law is limited to the gaps left 
by Parliament.114 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires a court, so far as it is 
possible to do so, to read legislation in a way which is compatible with rights set out in 
the E.C.H.R. but there are limits to the reach of this provision. 
 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 S.L.R. 1129 at [111]-
[113] (Singapore Court of Appeal). 
114 R v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Ex parte Begley [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1475 at 1480. 
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The courts are therefore reluctant to read further into statutes than the express wording of 
the statutes themselves. For example, the Court of Appeal in Al-Adsani v Government of 
Kuwait refused to read an overriding exception to the State Immunity Act in relation to 
acts of torture in violation of international law but which did not fall within one of the 
proscribed statutory exceptions, holding that the Act was intended to be a 
“comprehensive code and not subject to overriding considerations”. 115 The presumption 
is always that Parliament would not intend the court to act contrary to international law 
unless the clear language of the statute compels that conclusion, 116  but Ward L.J. 
regretfully concluded that “the Act is as plain as plain can be” and that Parliament would 
have had considered its international obligations when it legislated. Even after the 
enactment of section 3 of the Human Rights Act, the implication of an exception with 
respect to acts of torture was held not to be a valid interpretation of the State Immunity 
Act.117 
 
A possible concern is that the deference for statute may lead the court into taking a strict 
statutory interpretation approach without taking into account the wider context in which 
the legislation may have been formulated. For example, in Santos v Illidge,118 the Court 
of Exchequer Chamber upheld a contract for the sale of slaves in Brazil between a 
Brazilian purchaser and a British seller on grounds that the relevant British legislation 
prohibiting slavery was not intended to cover jurisdictions, such as Brazil, where the 
                                                 
115 The Times, 29 March 1996 (Transcript: Larking); (1996) 107 I.L.R. 536. See also Jones v Ministry of the 
Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270. 
116 Alcom Ltd v Republic of Columbia [1984] 1 A.C. 580 at 600. 
117 Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270 at 
[64]. See further below, section IV(d). 
118 (1860) 8 CB NS 861, 141 E.R. 1404. 
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slave trade was still legal. The scope of the legislation was unclear from its wording and 
could equally have been read in a manner which rendered the contract illegal.119 One is of 
course now looking at the case through more enlightened twenty-first century eyes where 
there can be no doubt that slavery is a prohibited evil, but Professor Kahn-Freund has 
argued that the case is also anomalous by the law of the period in which it was decided: 
 
“No one can read a decision like Santos v Illidge without being struck by the 
phenomenon that more than half a century after the beginning of the suppression 
of the slave trade by law and more than a quarter of a century after the trade had 
been condemned in emphatic terms in the consolidating statute of 1824, and 
slavery had been abolished in the Empire in 1833, Baron Bramwell and 
Blackburn J., regarded the matter entire as one of verbal interpretation of the 
statutes.”120 
 
However, it may be overly harsh to condemn the judges as it is possible to defend Santos 
on the grounds that the public policy against slavery at that time was merely regarded as 
domestic English public policy and had not yet graduated to the status of an international 
or even transnational public policy.121 Nevertheless, it should be observed that all of the 
judgments, including the dissenting judgment, focused purely on statutory construction 
and there was no consideration at all of the wider policy against slavery. For this, the 
                                                 
119 As shown in the dissenting judgment of Wightman J. (Pollock C.B. concurring). 
120 O. Kahn-Freund, “Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws”, Transactions of the 
Grotius Society, Vol. 39, Problems of Public and Private International Law, Transactions for the Year 
1953 (1953), p. 66 (footnote references omitted). Despite this extract, it should be pointed out that 
Professor Kahn-Freund argues that courts are more prepared to accord international application to common 
law rules rather than statutory rules. 
121 For example, slavery was only officially abolished in the United States when the Thirteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution was adopted in 1865.   
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decision perhaps serves as a cautionary note that courts should not be too engrossed in 
statutory interpretation so as to miss or not give adequate weight to any underlying 
transnational policy that may be relevant in guiding their interpretation of an English 
statute.122 
 
(b) Transnational public policy and the public policy of finality in litigation 
 
English law recognises the public policy of finality in litigation.123 This public policy 
finds force in the doctrines of res judicata and lis alibi pendens. There are limits however 
to the importance of finality in litigation. If a contract related to the traffic of drugs is 
declared to be valid by the courts of country X, the English court should be prepared to 
entertain fresh proceedings concerning that matter and refuse to allow that judgment to be 
raised as res judicata. This much is acknowledged by dictum in the Court of Appeal in 
ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani Haryanto (No. 2)124 where Neill L.J. thought that the 
crucial question in such a scenario is whether the public policy in favour of finality is 
overridden by some more important public policy based on the unenforceability of illegal 
contracts. His Lordship went on to opine that the public policy in favour of finality 
should not prevail if the illegality pertains to principles of public policy which are of the 
greatest importance and recognised in most jurisdictions throughout the world.125 It is 
suggested that it is all a question of balancing of the different policies and weighing up 
                                                 
122 See Human Rights Act 1998, s. 3. 
123 ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani Haryanto (No. 2) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 429. 
124 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 429. 
125 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 429 at 436. 
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which is more important126 and, arguably, transnational public policy, which stands for a 
higher order of universally accepted principles, should in most cases triumph over the 
public policy of finality in litigation.  
 
The two public policies may also coincide: in Merchant International Co v Naftogaz 
Ukrayiny,127 the Supreme Commercial Court of the Ukraine had set aside a Ukrainian 
lower court judgment and ordered a retrial in circumstances lacking due process. This 
effectively enabled the losing party in Ukraine, a state-owned entity, to re-litigate matters 
afresh. In an action for the enforcement of the original Ukrainian judgment, David Steel J. 
was faced with the argument that since the judgment of the lower court had been set aside, 
there was no longer any judgment left to enforce. He held that the real issue was the 
recognition of the Supreme Commercial Court’s judgment setting aside the original 
judgment and that that judgment should not be recognised as it fell short of the standards 
set out in Article 6 of the E.C.H.R. and the principles of legal certainty.  
 
(c) Transnational public policy and the policy of non-enforcement of foreign public laws 
 
Transnational public policy, with its emphasis on adherence to public international law 
and maintenance of the international public order, fosters a view of international 
camaraderie and of individual states working towards common goals. To a certain extent, 
this view would be misleading. It may be thought somewhat paradoxical that an English 
court will not countenance a contract which involves performance which breaks the laws 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., in Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425, where the public policy of finality 
triumphed over the policy of upholding contractual clauses. 
127 [2011] EWHC 1820 (Comm). 
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of a friendly foreign state128 but will refuse to interfere when the act complained of does 
not merely involve the breaking of a friendly foreign state’s laws but no less than the 
overthrow of its government. This is a result of a policy encapsulated by Dicey, Morris 
and Collins’s Rule 3 that: “English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action for 
the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a 
foreign State.”129 The policy has as its rationale that as a matter of international law, a 
sovereign cannot be allowed to assert its sovereignty within the territory of another.130 
There is debate over whether the Dicey formulation would be more accurately expressed 
in terms of choice of law rather than jurisdiction,131 but leaving that point aside, the effect 
of the rule is to tie the court’s hands when a state which is considered to be a friendly one 
requests for help in controlling insurgents who plot to overthrow the state. In De Wutz v 
Hendricks,132 it was held that “it was contrary to the law of nations” for a contract to raise 
money to support a rebellion against a foreign government with which the forum has 
friendly relations to be enforced, but where the case directly involves exercise of powers 
peculiar to the foreign state, Rule 3 kicks in. In President of the State of Equatorial 
Guinea v The Royal Bank of Scotland International,133 the Privy Council expressed the 
view that claims by the government of Equatorial Guinea, which was acknowledged to be 
a friendly foreign state,134 for damages and an injunction relating to an abortive coup 
attempt against the government, could fall foul of the rule on non-enforcement of foreign 
                                                 
128 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 K.B. 470; Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] A.C. 301. 
129 L. Collins (gen. ed.), Dicey, Morris and Collins: The Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 14th 
edn, 2006) Rule 3 (para. 5R-019, p. 100). 
130 Government of India v Taylor [1955] A.C. 491, 511; Re State of Norway’s Application (Nos 1 and 2) 
[1990] 1 A.C. 723; Mbasogo v Logo (No. 1) [2006] EWCA Civ 1370; [2007] Q.B. 846.  
131 A. Briggs, “The Revenue Law in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover” [2001] Sing. J. Legal Stud. 
280 at 295-296. 
132 (1824) 2 Bing. 314. 
133 [2006] UKPC 7. 
134 [2006] UKPC 7 at [2]. 
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public laws. This was followed through by the Court of Appeal in the subsequent case of 
Mbasogo v Logo (No. 1).135 The claims advanced by Equatorial Guinea included damages 
for the costs incurred in investigating an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government, 
detaining and prosecuting suspects, increased security measures and commercial and 
economic damage suffered due to the declaration of a state of emergency. The Court of 
Appeal thought that the underlying principle of Rule 3 of Dicey, Morris and Collins was 
that an English court would not enforce or lend their aid to the assertion of sovereign 
authority by one state in the territory of another.136 The losses claimed were those which 
could only be suffered by a state and were therefore characterised as a non-justiciable 
exercise of sovereign power.137 A converse decision in Mbasogo had the potential to lead 
courts into difficult questions concerning whether the government of Equatorial Guinea 
was an oppressive tyranny; no such politically sensitive question arose in De Wutz. No 
doubt there is room for a more subtle and detailed examination of Rule 3 and the 
authorities on it, but for the purposes of this article the observation that may be made is 
that the policy against non-enforcement of foreign public laws does not tend to support 
the existence of a transnational public policy of helping a friendly foreign state.138 
 
In a less politically contentious area however, the policy on non-enforcement of foreign 
public laws shows signs of abrogation. It has been argued that a transnational policy of 
                                                 
135 [2006] EWCA Civ 1370; [2007] Q.B. 846. 
136 [2006] EWCA Civ 1370; [2007] Q.B. 846 at [41]. 
137 See also Emperor of Austria v Day (1861) 3 De G. & F. & J. 217, 232 (Lord Campbell L.C.) and 250 
(Turner L.J.). 
138 Even being an ally at war with a common enemy is insufficient: Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v 
Slatford (No. 2) [1953] 1 Q.B. 248 at 265. 
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protection of cultural heritage in general has emerged. 139  There exists a significant 
number of international instruments in this field.140 For example, there is the UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970 which has been ratified by more than 
one hundred states including the United Kingdom. Various national courts have also, 
independently of any international agreement, held that to enforce contracts which 
undermine efforts to prevent the illegal removal of cultural objects from their home 
countries would be against public policy.141 That said, this transnational public policy 
conflicts with other policies: the policy of freedom of movement of cultural materials;142 
the (domestic) policy of requiring clear property rules and protecting a bona fide 
purchaser for value;143 and most significantly, the policy of non-enforcement of foreign 
revenue, penal and other public laws.  
 
The seemingly rigid application of the policy of non-enforcement of foreign sovereign 
laws, as illustrated by the cases on revolution against foreign governments, militates 
                                                 
139 L.V. Prott, “Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage” (1989) 
217 Recueil des Cours 218. 
140 E.g., the 1950 Florence Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials; 
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; the 
1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. In the E.U. context, see 
Council Directive 93/7 /E.E.C. of 15 March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed 
from the Territory of a Member State [1993] O.J. L 74 (incorporated into United Kingdom law by the 
Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994/501, as amended by S.I. 1997/1719 and S.I. 
2001/3972. 
141 E.g., Allgemeine Versicherungsgesellschaft v EK, B.G.H.Z. 59, 82 (22 June, 1982). See also Repubblica 
dell’Ecuador-Casa della cultura ecuadoriana v Danusso, R.D.I.P.P. 18 (1982), 625 (Tribunal of Torino, 25 
March 1982) (described in Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International 
Arbitration” in Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (I.C.C.A. 
Congress Series No. 3), 1987, p. 269). 
142 Enshrined in the 1950 Florence Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Materials.  
143 E.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 23-25. 
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against any balancing exercise similar to that suggested in relation to the public policy of 
finality in litigation. While the extent of the rule has been doubted, particularly with 
respect to the existence of a category of “other public laws” under which foreign 
legislation protecting national cultural property would usually fall,144 the full rule has 
nevertheless been judicially approved.145 The rule however leads to anomalous results. In 
AG of New Zealand v Ortiz, 146  the Court of Appeal considered that New Zealand 
legislation purporting to forfeit historic articles which was illegally exported could not be 
enforced in England because that would entail the exercise of foreign sovereign authority 
outside its jurisdiction. 147  However, when the foreign state has been able to gain 
possession of the property within its jurisdiction, all that would be required of the English 
court would be to recognise the consequences of the exercise of foreign sovereign 
authority within its own territory. To put it in another way, if the foreign state is able to 
perfect its title to the property while the property is within its jurisdiction, any claim it 
may bring before the English court to assert that title would not involve any enforcement 
of foreign public law but merely the recognition thereof.148 The claim would then be 
treated as a property claim where the state is merely exercising ownership rights in the 
same way as a private individual.  
 
                                                 
144 However, in AG of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] 1 A.C. 1, New Zealand legislation providing for the 
forfeiture of historic artefacts which were unlawfully exported was characterised as a penal law by Ackner 
L.J. (at 34) and O’Connor L.J. (at 35). Lord Denning M.R. thought it was a public law (at 24). 
145 Mbasogo v Logo Ltd (No. 1) [2006] EWCA Civ 1370; [2007] Q.B. 846 at [51]. Cf. Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2009] Q.B. 22 esp. at [125].  
146 [1984] 1 A.C. 1. 
147 The House of Lords decided the case on a narrow ground of statutory interpretation of the New Zealand 
legislation and expressly refused to express any conclusion on the correctness or otherwise of the Court of 
Appeal dicta on the non-enforceability of the New Zealand legislation in England: [1984] 1 A.C. 1 at 46. 
148 Princess Paley Olga v Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718; Luther v Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532. 
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Whether a claim is allowable or not depends on the distinction between recognition and 
enforcement. This in turn hinges on whether a foreign state is able to legislate and take 
action to seize the property, or establish an immediate right to possession to the 
property,149 in time. The turning of a decision on such factors does the law no credit. An 
attempt to rid the law of such anomaly, at least where national cultural property is 
concerned, was made in Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v The Barakat 
Galleries Ltd.150 Iranian antiquities had found their way to Barakat, a gallery in London. 
Iran claimed that it owned the antiquities by virtue of Iranian legislation. The Court of 
Appeal held that the effect of the Iranian legislation was to vest title to the antiquities to 
Iran in Iran. Therefore the claim was characterised as a patrimonial claim, in other words, 
one concerning ownership, and did not involve any issue of enforcement of Iranian public 
law. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in obiter dicta showed the extent to which they 
would have gone to allow the return of the antiquities to Iran. The court stated that if they 
were wrong in concluding that the claim was merely a patrimonial one, enforcement of 
Iranian public law which sought to protect the Iranian cultural heritage would not be 
precluded. The Court of Appeal, drawing on a number of international instruments in the 
field, referred to positive reasons of policy, stating that there is “international recognition 
that States should assist one another to prevent the unlawful removal of cultural objects 
including antiquities”151 and “international acceptance of the desirability of protection of 
                                                 
149 It is not necessary for the state to have reduced the property into its possession within its jurisdiction: 
Iran v Barakat [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2009] Q.B. 22 at [86]; Brink’s Global Services Inc v Igrox Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 1817 (Comm) at [28]-[31] (aff’d [2010] EWCA Civ 1207; [2011] I.R.L.R. 343). 
150 [2009] Q.B. 22. 
151 [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2009] Q.B. 22 at [154]-[155]. See also Staughton J. in A-G of New Zealand v 
Ortiz [1982] Q.B. 349 at 371-372 (overruled [1984] 1 A.C. 1). 
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the national heritage”.152 It would therefore be contrary to public policy for claims by a 
state to recover antiquities which form part of its national heritage to be shut out.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the obiter remarks of the Court of Appeal would be taken 
up and made law. In particular, it cannot be said for certain that a transnational public 
policy of protecting national cultural heritage has taken root in English law.153 The Court 
of Appeal in Barakat referred to a number of international instruments in this field, but it 
is notable that, apart from an E.U. Council Directive, the United Kingdom has not 
implemented or ratified them.154 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal’s 
progressive stance should be supported; the United Kingdom has legislation that protects 
its own cultural heritage155  and there seems no sense in refusing to enforce foreign 
legislation which has a similar purpose. 156  Comity and the “hope of reciprocity” 157 
support this view, in addition to the general importance of protecting the national cultural 
heritage. 
 
(d) Conflicts between a rule of jus cogens and the doctrine of state immunity 
 
                                                 
152 [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2009] Q.B. 22 at [163]. 
153 E.g., Peer International Corp v Termidor Publishers Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; [2004] Ch. 212. 
154 The Court of Appeal referred to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
(full titles in fn. 140 above). The U.K. has accepted the 1970 UNESCO Convention but not ratified it, while 
the U.K. has not ratified the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
155 E.g., the Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953; the National Heritage Act 1980. 
156 See Republic of Ecuador v Danusso, Civil and Criminal District Court of Turin, First Civil Section, No. 
4410/79; Court of Appeal of Turin, Second Civil Section, No. 593/82 (discussed by Prott, “Problems of 
Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage” (1989) 217 Recueil des Cours 218 at 
283 and 296-297. 
157 Staughton J. in AG of New Zealand v Ortiz [1982] Q.B. 349 at 372. Cf. Lord Denning M.R. at [1984] 1 
A.C. 1 at 24. 
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Jus cogens stand for a special category of public international law rules which are not 
dependent on consent by the states, cannot be derogated from, and are erga omnes in 
character. While which rules can be classified as this superior form of international law 
rules is not settled, certain rules dealing with the protection of fundamental human rights 
definitely qualify, examples being the prohibition against genocide, slavery and torture.  
Such rules naturally find alternative form as transnational public policy: Lord Steyn in 
Kuwait Airways stated that “there may be an international public policy requiring states 
to respect fundamental human rights”.158 It is submitted that the phrase “may be” should 
be replaced by the word “is”.159 
 
Balanced against jus cogens is the doctrine of state immunity. The doctrine of state 
immunity renders foreign states immune to the jurisdiction of English courts. It is a 
public international law principle based on the principle of sovereign equality of all states; 
ergo, the courts of one sovereign should not sit in judgment on another sovereign. The 
doctrine is now recognised not to confer absolute immunity, but covers only acts of a 
sovereign nature (acts jure imperii) and not commercial acts (acts jure gestionis).160 So, 
while section 1 of the State Immunity Act 1978 enshrines the general principle of state 
immunity, sections 2 to 11 list exceptions to the general principle. Tellingly, there is no 
specific exception dealing with violations of fundamental human rights, even those of a 
jus cogens nature. The closest would be section 5(1) which provides that a state is not 
immune as respect proceedings in respect of death or personal injury. This provision 
                                                 
158 [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 2 A.C. 883 at [115].  
159 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249. 
160 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529; Playa Larga (Owners of 
Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 A.C. 244.  
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could take away a state’s immunity with respect to torture. However, as section 5 adds a 
qualifier that the death or personal injury must be caused by an act or omission in the 
United Kingdom, its scope as a safeguard of transnational principles is limited.  
 
In Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,161 the House of Lords 
had to consider how the two international law rules of jus cogens and state immunity 
balanced up against each other. Damages for alleged torture committed in Saudi Arabia 
were claimed against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a few of its officers. The defence 
of state immunity was raised. The claim did not fall within any of the exceptions 
specified in the State Immunity Act 1978. However, it was argued that the doctrine of 
state immunity deprived the claimant of his right of access to court as set out in Article 6 
of the E.C.H.R. and that section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 required the court to 
interpret the 1978 Act in a manner which would deny the defence of state immunity on 
the facts of the case.162  
 
The House of Lords reluctantly conceded that Article 6 of the E.C.H.R. was engaged.163 
However, it ultimately concluded that the restriction of the claimant’s Article 6 rights was 
directed to a legitimate objective, was not disproportionate and the defence of state 
immunity stood for both Saudi Arabia and its officers. The claimant had argued that the 
prohibition of torture is a rule of jus cogens and hierarchically superior to the doctrine of 
state immunity. The jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture was acknowleged by 
                                                 
161 [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270. 
162 Either by reading an implied exception to the 1978 Act or making a declaration of incompatibility under 
the Human Rights Act, s. 4. 
163 Following the decision of the E.Ct.H.R. in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273. 
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the House of Lords;164 but on the second point, it was held that the doctrine of state 
immunity was a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of the national court whereas a 
jus cogens norm is part of substantive law. The House of Lords concluded that: “there is 
no substantive content in the procedural plea of state immunity upon which a jus cogens 
mandate can bite”.165 The argument which failed in Jones was essentially one based on 
the “normative hierarchy theory”166  i.e. that a rule of jus cogens, being normatively 
superior to the doctrine of state immunity, should prevail over the latter. This has found 
favour elsewhere, 167  but was adroitly sidestepped by the House of Lords by the 
substance/procedure distinction. With respect, the substance and procedure explanation 
belies the position of a rule of jus cogens as a peremptory norm of international law that 
is erga omnes in nature. In order to give proper effect to a rule of jus cogens, it should be 
recognised to trump over not just rules of substance, but also rules which prevent its 
enforcement.168 
 
A reformulation of the argument in terms of transnational public policy may help in 
upholding jus cogens norms; after all, public policy can prevail over objectionable 
                                                 
164 [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270 at [14]-[15] (Lord Bingham); at [39] (Lord Hoffman). See also R v 
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147 at 197-
199. 
165 [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270 at [24]. 
166 L. McGregor, “State Immunity and Jus Cogens” (2006) 55 I.C.L.Q. 437 at 440. 
167 Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany (Italian Court of Cassation), reproduced in original Italian text 
in (2004) 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539; Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, 
joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajic in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2002) 34 
E.H.R.R. 273. 
168 K. Parlett, “Immunity in Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging Exception” (2006) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 
49 at 51. The alleged victims are pursuing claims before the E.Ct.H.R.: Jones v U.K. and Mitchell & Ors v 
U.K., Appl. Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06. 
  41 
foreign procedural169 as well as substantive rules.170 There can be no doubt that of all 
public international law rules, rules of jus cogens would be part of transnational public 
policy and transnational public policy can be used to disapply the doctrine of state 
immunity if that doctrine leads to a result which offends public policy. Letting states and 
its officials violate fundamental human rights norms under cover of state immunity, it is 
suggested, should be considered to so offend. 
 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the issues involved here are not so simple as to be 
resolved by a simple recharacterisation of the situation as involving transnational public 
policy.171 State immunity involves a consideration of international and political factors. 
The solution to the relationship between breach of jus cogens norms and state immunity 
needs to be worked out on an international level and not by national courts. The House of 
Lords in Jones were careful to canvass various international instruments, decisions and 
academic writings, before reaching the conclusion that there was no exception to 
immunity over a civil claim for damages pursuant to allegations of torture committed 
elsewhere. While there has been some authority otherwise, 172  the preponderance of 
                                                 
169 Bramwell B. in Crawley v Isaacs (1867) 16 L.T. 529 at 531 stated: “If the proceedings be in accordance 
with the practice of the foreign court, but that practice is not in accordance with natural justice, this court 
will not allow itself to be concluded by them.” 
170 Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 K.B. 591; Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch. 522. 
171 It must be pointed out that certain issues are outside the scope of this article. For example, this article 
does not consider the debate over whether there is universal civil jurisdiction over breach of jus cogens 
norms, especially if there is a lack of a link between the forum and the case (see H. Fox, The Law of State 
Immunity (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn, 2008) Ch. 6; J. Wright, “Retribution but No Recompense: A Critique of 
the Torturer’s Immunity from Civil Suit” (2010) 30 O.J.L.S. 143). Nor does this article examine whether it 
is appropriate for civil claims alleging breach of fundamental human rights to be shoe-horned into 
traditional tort causes of action which may not adequately highlight, or provide the opportunity for courts to 
seize upon, the supranational implications of the claim (see F. Larocque, “The Tort of Torture” (2009) 17 
Tort L. Rev. 158). Cf. the position under the Alien Tort Claims Act (U.S.) where claims have as their basis 
breach of international law.  
172 Notably, Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany (Italian Court of Cassation), reproduced in original 
Italian text in (2004) 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539 and Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic 
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decisions by other national courts supports the House of Lords’ conclusion.173 A majority 
of the European Court of Human Rights (E.Ct.H.R.) in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,174 
pointing towards the need to promote comity and good relations between states, also held 
that it was not established as a matter of international law that a state is not entitled to 
immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged torture committed outside 
that state.175  
 
A “powerful minority” 176  of the E.Ct.H.R. in Al-Adsani argued that the majority’s 
decision was based on an unmerited distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, 
the majority having conceded that a jus cogens rule overrides the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in criminal proceedings. 177  Generally, the status quo seems to echo the 
majority’s divide at least in relation to criminal proceedings against an individual and 
civil proceedings against a state,178 but whether there are grounds for such a divide is 
outside the scope of this article. However, a few points may be made on the assumption 
that the status quo is correct. On the one hand, immunity may not prevail in criminal 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Germany, Case No. 11/2000, Areios Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court), reproduced in original Greek text 
in (2001) 49 Nomiko Vima 212, noted M. Gavounelli and I. Bantebas (2001) 95 Am. Journal of Int. L. 198. 
However, the same court in the latter case later refused to grant execution of the judgment (Wright, 
“Retribution but No Recompense: A Critique of the Torturer’s Immunity from Civil Suit” (2010) 30 
O.J.L.S. 143 at 163). 
173 Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran (2004) 71 O.R. (3d) 675, 128 I.L.R. 586 (Ontario Court of Appeal); 
Gaddafi, sub nom SOS Attentat and Castelnau d’Esnault v Khadafi, Head of State of Libya No. 00-
87.21513, March 2000 (French Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber); Varvarin Case, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 58 (2005) 2860. 
174 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273. See also Kalogeropoulos v Greece and Germany E.C.H.R. No. 0059021/00, 
Judgment on Admissibility, 12 December 2002. 
175 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273, 289-292.  
176 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 A.C. 270 at [18]. 
177 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273 at 299-301.  
178 See, e.g., R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 
A.C. 147 at 264 (Lord Hutton); 278 (Lord Millett); 280, 281, 287 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). See 
also Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran (2004) 71 O.R. (3d) 675, 128 I.L.R. 586 (paras 91-93) (Ontario 
Court of Appeal). Cf. Khurts Bat v The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court [2011] EWHC 
2029 (Admin); Breyer J. in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain (2004) 542 U.S. 692 at 762-763; McGregor, “State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens” (2006) 55 I.C.L.Q. 437 at 444. 
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proceedings, but criminal proceedings require a degree of political will. The remedy is 
primarily the punishment of the perpetrator and may not involve a substantial personal 
monetary remedy for the individual victim. 179  Financial satisfaction for wrongs 
committed against an individual would be best pursued in civil litigation before national 
courts. The point then is that national courts play an important role in not letting human 
rights perpetrators escape from the repercussions of their actions.180 On the other hand, 
the practical ramifications of not allowing a plea of immunity by foreign states in civil 
proceedings before national courts have to be considered. The Court of Appeal in Al-
Adsani v Kuwait, 181  in a judgment quoted approvingly by the majority of the 
E.Ct.H.R.,182  was concerned about opening the floodgates should they disallow state 
immunity to be raised as a defence in respect to alleged torture conducted in Kuwait. It 
noted that: “A vast number of people come to this country each year seeking refuge and 
asylum, and many of these allege that they have been tortured in the country whence they 
came” and that the court would be in no position, in the absence of the foreign state 
submitting to its jurisdiction, of accurately assessing the claim. Further, the impact on the 
defending state must be considered. If a state has engaged in violations of human rights 
which affect a massive number of people, e.g. during a war, it would be unable to 
compensate all victims who bring civil claims against it without depleting national 
resources and threatening its existence as a functional state.183 For example, the treaty 
                                                 
179 Cf. civil law jurisdictions where combined criminal and civil actions may be brought, thus allowing the 
claimant the possibility of also recovering damages. 
180 All the more so since an individual litigant, as compared to a state, may find that the only recourse or the 
easier recourse is to a national court rather than an international tribunal: see Statute of the I.C.J., Art. 34; 
cf. E.C.H.R., Section II, Art. 34.  
181 The Times, 29 March 1996 (Transcript: J. Larking); (1996) 107 I.L.R. 536. 
182 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273 at 279-280. 
183 J. Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) p. 
204.  
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dealing with compensation for victims of Nazi persecution expressly provided that the 
capacity of the Federal Republic of Germany to compensate the victims may be taken 
into consideration.184 
 
The arguments then are arrayed in conflicting emotive and practical terms. Public 
international law was traditionally concerned with the relations between states, but has 
developed to include rules on the protection of human rights. To allow states to use state 
immunity to escape violations of human rights, especially those consisting of jus cogens 
norms, would be “a complete denial of access to justice in cases that cry out for legal 
remedies perhaps more than any other.”185 One could argue that state immunity should be 
seen as a privilege and not a right; a state which violates jus cogens “steps outside the 
boundaries drawn by the international community for itself… [and] thus forfeits the 
privileges accorded to the members.”186 The doctrine of state immunity has evolved from 
the absolute to the restrictive doctrine; there is no reason why it could not evolve to an 
even more limited version. The E.Ct.H.R. has stressed that its ruling in Al-Adsani 
represented “current” public international law but “does not preclude a development in 
customary international law in the future.”187 Yet the practical repercussions on defendant 
states as alluded to above cannot be brushed away. That said, it may be that for many 
victims of torture or other breaches of jus cogens, financial compensation is secondary; 
the establishment of the responsibility of the perpetrators of those breaches and the 
                                                 
184 A. Zimmermann, “Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus Cogens – Some Critical 
Remarks” (1994-1995) 16 Mich. J. Int. L. 433 at 435. 
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vindication of their right to have their fundamental human rights protected would be 
adequate satisfaction.188  
 
The failure of public international law to adequately provide for the interaction between 
state immunity and violations of jus cogens is disappointing.189 Private international law 
may have to take up the cudgel in the form of transnational public policy, under which a 
balancing exercise of all the factors mentioned above could be carried out. The myriad of 
factors that need to be weighed against each other lends itself particularly to the exercise 
of the court’s discretion under public policy. It is not however suggested that use of 
transnational public policy would provide the final solution to this issue, nor that it would 
be the most satisfactory solution.190 However, until public international law finds a way 
to integrate state immunity and respect for jus cogens norms, national courts should not 
shirk from ensuring that fundamental universal values are not undermined in civil 
litigation and it may be that transnational public policy provides the best tool for the 
moment.  
 
(e) The constraints of E.U. law 
 
The Rome I and Rome II Regulations contain a provision allowing a court to refuse to 
apply a rule of the lex causae as identified through the Regulations’s rules if such 
                                                 
188 Wright, “Retribution but No Recompense: A Critique of the Torturer’s Immunity from Civil Suit” (2010) 
30 O.J.L.S. 143 at 178. 
189 The Working Group to the U.N. Convention on State Immunity concluded that the issue “did not seem 
ripe enough” for the interaction between the doctrine of state immunity and jus cogens norms to be codified. 
See General Assembly, Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of State and their Property: Report of the 
Chairman of the Working Group, A/C.6/54/L.12 (12 November 1999) para. 47. 
190 In particular, some of those factors may be more appropriately assessed by international courts rather 
than national courts. 
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application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum. 191  The 
Brussels I Regulation also permits the forum court to refuse to recognise a foreign 
judgment if it is manifestly contrary to its public policy.192 It is clear that public policy 
for the purposes of these instruments means national public policy, but national public 
policy includes E.U. public policy.193 Significantly, the E.C.H.R. is considered part of 
E.U. public policy. 194  The E.C.H.R. sets out fundamental rights deriving from the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States”.195 However, the principles it 
espouses are largely accepted outside the European Union so that it is arguable that the 
E.C.H.R. not only reflects European public policy but also transnational public policy. If 
the transnational public policy is not derived from European sources, there does not seem 
to be any good reason why that policy could not also be applied by using the public 
policy provisions in the E.U. private international law instruments. If one takes a literal 
approach to interpretation, as seems to be favoured by the E.C.J.,196 transnational public 
policy that is applied by the court of the forum is patently part of the “public policy in the 
Member State” 197  concerned or is part of the “public policy (ordre public) of the 
forum.” 198   The point made therefore is that there is room for the application of 
transnational public policy, whether European or non-European in origin, within the E.U. 
private international law regime. 
                                                 
191 Art. 21 (Rome I Reg.); Art. 26 (Rome II Reg.). 
192 Art. 34(1). 
193 See text to fns 9-14 above. 
194 T.E.U., Art. 6(2) ([2006] O.J. C 321 E/1). The E.Ct.H.R. has also described the E.C.H.R. as “a 
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)”: Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 
99 at [75]. 
195 Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] E.C.R. I-1935 at [38]. 
196 E.g., Case C-462/06 Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v Rouard [2008] E.C.R. I-3965; 
Case C-103/05 Reisch Montage AG v Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels GmbH [2006] E.C.R. I-6827.  
197 Art. 34(1). 
198 Art. 21 (Rome I Reg.); Art. 26 (Rome II Reg.). 
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That said, mixed messages have been sent out on the receptiveness of the E.U. private 
international law system to transnational public policy. A case in point is the 
Commission’s proposals on reforming the Brussels I Regulation. On the one hand, the 
Commission has attempted to restrict “torpedo” actions which have been argued to 
breach Article 6 of the E.C.H.R. which provides for a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The 
Commission has recommended that courts first seised have to decide on whether it has 
jurisdiction within six months unless there are exceptional circumstances which make 
this time-frame impossible.199 This is an attempt to deal with criticisms directed against 
cases like Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl.200   
 
On the other hand, the Commission has recommended abolishing the public policy 
defence which allows a Member State court to refuse to recognise or enforce another 
Member State court’s judgment on grounds that it is contrary to the former State’s public 
policy. As discussed above, it is clear that the current public policy provision in the 
Brussels I Regulation includes the E.C.H.R. and the jurisprudence of the E.Ct.H.R. Thus, 
a judgment handed down in circumstances where the court had refused to hear the 
defence counsel because the defendant was not himself in court could be refused 
enforcement on the grounds that a manifest breach of a fundamental right to be defended 
had occurred. 201 If carried through though, the Commission’s proposal would mean that, 
aside from the provision for a lack of “fair trial” defence,202 an enforcing court would not 
                                                 
199 COM (2010) 748 final, draft Art. 29(2). 
200 Case C-116/02 [2003] E.C.R. I-14693. 
201 Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] E.C.R. I-1935. 
202 COM (2010) 748 final, draft Art. 46. See also draft Art. 45. 
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be able to assess for itself whether the judgment granting court has violated any 
fundamental human rights or other universally accepted principles of morality and 
justice. 203  This could be construed as a breach of the enforcing Member State’s 
international obligations, including its obligations under the E.C.H.R.204 In view of the 
future accession of the E.U. to the E.C.H.R.,205 a reconsideration of this proposal must 




The objectives of this article were three-fold: first, to make the case for the emergence of 
a category of transnational public policy; secondly, to identify its make-up; and thirdly, to 
study how it stands up to other policies and rules.  
 
No doubt it will strike some that this category is less than hard-edged;206 but public 
policy in general has always escaped precise definition. The effect of recognising this 
category of transnational public policy is that some of the rules which are normally 
applicable when public policy is invoked need not apply.207 In addition, it could be used 
as a tool to give greater effect to certain rules of international law and better protect 
fundamental principles of justice and morality which are sufficiently shared. Further, 
                                                 
203 The public policy defence is also suggested to be retained for two categories of judgments, i.e. 
judgments in defamation cases and collective redress proceedings. 
204 A. Dickinson, “The Revision of the Brussels I Regulation” (2010) 12 Yearbook of P.I.L. 247 at 260; 
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report (28.6.2011), 2010/0383 (COD), p. 46. 
205 See T.E.U., Art. 6(2) ([2006] O.J. C 321 E/1); Protocol No. 14 to the E.C.H.R. of 13 May 2004 (entered 
into force on 1 June 2010). 
206 It was said to be “nebulous” concept by the Court of Appeal in Apostolides v Orams [2010] EWCA Civ 
9; [2011] Q.B. 519 at [59]. 
207 Such as a need for a connection with the forum. 
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transnational public policy may in certain cases apply in a positive manner as opposed to 
the traditional negative effect of public policy. For example, transnational public policy 
may lead to the application of an otherwise inapplicable foreign public law protecting 
that state’s cultural heritage or be used to give effect to a fundamental human right.208  
 
That said, its limits cannot be denied. Transnational public policy cannot be read as a 
form of supranational public policy. There is also a delicate interplay of various factors 
when transnational public policy is at stake. A court has to navigate through potentially 
treacherous ground involving identifying what suffices as transnational public policy, 
comity and foreign relations, its role within the constitutional framework, and the impact 
of conflicting forum public policy and E.U. law, so much so that it is no surprise that the 
judiciary have had little opportunity to articulate this concept in more detail. Nevertheless, 
it is submitted that the contours of transnational public policy are gradually becoming 
more indelible. 
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208 However, the positive use of public policy within the context of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
will have to be further considered given the negative phrasing of the relevant provisions. 
